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Virtually Touching: Embodied engagement in telematic and virtual reality performance 
Sita Popat 
 
Published in Jo Butterworth and Liesbeth Wildschut (eds.) Contemporary Choreography: A 
Critical Reader (2
nd
 edition), Routledge, 2017. 
 
My research into digital dance and performance over more than twenty years stems primarily 
from my love of movement. In the mid-1990s, I suffered a back injury whilst studying for a 
Dance degree.  I could not take technique classes, so instead I spent time in the library 
discovering a new medium called the Internet. I was intrigued by the amount of dance-related 
works appearing in digital formats at this time (see Dixon 2007), given the apparent 
disembodiment of remote communications technologies. To misquote artist Roy AscottÕs 
seminal 1990 essay, could there be love in the telematic embrace? Initially I was sceptical, but 
over time I saw and experienced more and more performance works which convinced me that 
virtual touch was more than mere illusion.  In this chapter, I recall three of these 
performances in which touch between remotely-located performers and/or participants played 
a key part; Telematic Dreaming by Paul Sermon (1994), Escape Velocity by Company in 
Space (1999) and Unheimlich by Steve Dixon, Paul Sermon, Andrea Zapp and Matthias 
Fuchs (2005).  I will explore why people often try to touch each other and objects around 
them in virtual and telematic environments, where touch in any physical form is obviously 
impossible.  My argument draws upon understandings of the body through proprioception, 
somatics and movement memory to explain how the act of reaching out to touch enables us to 
experience presence in telematic and virtual reality environments.  The discussion will be 
expanded through an account of my experience of Gibson/MartelliÕs White Island (2014), in 
which an Oculus Rift
1
 head-mounted display unit places the viewer/participant in a virtual 
reality hot air balloon drifting over an Arctic landscape amongst icy cliffs. I will conclude by 
considering the importance of dance and embodied knowledge to the future design and 
analysis of virtual worlds. 
 
A short history of virtual touch in three telematic performances  
One of my earliest influences in dance and technology research was Susan KozelÕs 1994 
essay in Dance Theatre Journal titled ÔSpacemaking: Experiences of a Virtual BodyÕ (see 
Kozel 2007: 92-102).  In this essay she described her experiences of performing in Paul 
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23 February 2016).  Oculus Rift is one of a number of new virtual reality head-mounted 
display units in development, including HTC Vive, Samsung Gear VR and Sony Playstation 
VR. 
SermonÕs Telematic Dreaming earlier that year in Finland.  In the 1994 version, Telematic 
Dreaming was an installation involving two beds, one in a gallery with the public passing 
through it, and one in a separate location.  Kozel performed on the bed in the separate location 
(let us call it Bed A), which was covered with a blue-screen sheet.  A camera directly above 
Bed A sent its video feed to a projector directly above the bed in the gallery (Bed B), so that 
KozelÕs image was projected down onto Bed B, where it could be seen by people passing 
through the gallery.  People could sit or climb onto the bed, attempt to touch fingers with 
Kozel via her image, or play and move with her image as she moved.  Video cameras picked 
up the combined image of Kozel and the gallery visitors together on Bed B, and fed it to 
monitor screens positioned around both Bed B and Bed A. This enabled Kozel and the 
visitors to see themselves together in the virtual space represented on the monitors. 
 
From the description, Telematic Dreaming might sound like a primarily visual experience, 
since everything is mediated via cameras and screens.  Even Bed B in the gallery acts as a 
screen for the projection of KozelÕs image.  Yet KozelÕs writing takes a phenomenological 
perspective to tell a different story.  She wrote about the intensity of her embodied experience 
of being on the bed with the other participants Ð of her virtual lover, who moved with her and 
came back to place a red rose on the pillow of Bed B next to her virtual head; of the person 
who elbowed her image in the stomach, causing her to fold up as if physically hit (2007: 97). 
I was also struck by the description of how Kozel moved her hand to touch the hand of a 
participant that was resting upon her own virtual thigh, and she was surprised when her hand 
bumped into the bulk of her physical leg (100). Paul Sermon has created several other 
installations using similar techniques.  He talks about Ôtouching with my eyesÕ in telematic 
work.  The image of oneÕs body acts as an extension into a virtual space, where it enables a 
visually constructed, haptic connection with other people and objects (see Dinkla and Leeker 
2002). The level of embodied engagement described by Kozel demonstrated a strong 
connection between her physical and virtual bodies, and between her own body and those of 
the other participants.   
 
Fast-forward to 1999 and the third International Dance and Technology conference (IDAT) at 
Arizona State University.  I was in the audience of Company in SpaceÕs performance of 
Escape Velocity.  We were in a white box studio in Tempe, Arizona, USA, facing towards a 
stage space where dancer Hellen Sky was performing.  Another dancer, Louise Taube, was in 
Melbourne, Australia in a similar studio arrangement. Both dancers had shaved heads and 
they were dressed in similar clothes.  Each dancer was accompanied by a camera operator, 
who was also effectively a performer.  The camera operators moved around the dancers, 
recording video sometimes at a distance and sometimes tightly close up.  The video feeds 
from the two cameras were sent directly to a vision-mixing desk where a video artist mixed 
them together with background graphics.  The combined video of both dancers was projected 
onto the back walls of each stage space.  Thus each audience could see their ÔlocalÕ dancer 
and camera operator on the stage, and behind them the video of both dancers performing 
together in virtual space.  At one point, the dancers each made their way over to the white 
wall of their individual studios, and the camera operators recorded close up shots of them 
rubbing their heads tenderly against the walls.  The video artist mixed the two video feeds so 
that the dancers appeared to be gently rubbing their shaved heads against each other.  The 
dancers turned to watch the combined image projected at the back of each stage, each 
caressing the wall but seeing themselves caressing each othersÕ heads.  The deep sensuality, 
tenderness and intimacy of the connection between the two dancers belied the distance 
between them, literally half a world apart. This moment remained with me and other members 
of the audience, cementing my feeling that there was something more than the virtual illusion 
in that connection. 
 
Forward again to 2005, when Steve Dixon, Paul Sermon, Mathias Fuchs and Andrea Zapp 
collaborated on Unheimlich. In this performance, two actors in a blue-screen studio in 
Manchester, UK interacted with an audience in USA to create an improvised performance. 
The video feed of the two actors in Manchester was mixed with the video feed of the stage in 
the USA, together with background images and graphics. This combined image was projected 
into both the Manchester studio and the USA stage space.  Audience members could get up 
onto the stage and perform alongside the two actors, who were playing mischievous sisters 
whose parents had gone out for the evening.  They could see the combined image and respond 
accordingly.
2
 This improvised participatory performance is the first of my three examples in 
which audio was included, so the participants and actors could speak to each other as well as 
seeing their images together.  Yet despite this option to talk and negotiate the space verbally, 
Unheimlich showed clearly how touch was both encouraged and desired.  There were 
repeated examples of the participants and the actors attempting to touch, stroke, put an arm 
around, help up from the floor Ð many different little forms of physical contact, impossible to 
achieve physically when the participants and the actors were continents apart.  Yet somehow 
it was an important part of the process of working together in that virtual space. 
 
Virtually Touching 
In 2008, Steve Dixon gave a speech in the historic Hellerau theatre in which he observed that 
people in telematic spaces will often attempt to touch each other more quickly and intimately 
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 Unheimlich movie documentation is available at 
http://www.paulsermon.org/unheimlich/downloads.htm (accessed 23rd February 2016) 
than they would do normally in physical space. In telematics, the avatar is usually a direct 
visual representation of the participant, so on the screen I see the image of my own body 
reaching out towards the image of someone elseÕs body.  If the image of my body touches the 
image of the other person then we appear to make contact in that virtual space, even though 
we might be many miles distant from each other in the physical world, as in the case of 
Hellen Sky and Louise Taube in Escape Velocity. The fact that one cannot make physical 
contact with the flesh of the other person seems to suspend some of the social prohibitions 
associated with touching the bodies of relative strangers in Western cultures. Instead virtual 
reality allows, or even invites, experimentation with the culturally prohibited or Ôun-doableÕ, 
as ÔrealÕ world norms and rules seem less relevant.  
 
Critically, the un-doable remains un-doable.  You can try to touch the other person without 
the usual social consequences, because you both know that the touch will not occur in a 
physical sense, even if you both enact touching and being touched. So cultural norms can be 
safely suspended by agreement between participants.  Such agreement is usually tacit in 
nature but managed through physical negotiation.  Kozel explained in her article on Telematic 
Dreaming that interactions with participants tended to start as tentative fingertip-touching or 
other small contact-making, in order to establish the boundaries of touch and interaction in 
this context (2007: 93-4).  In Unheimlich, the move to more intimate touching was generally 
much faster because the context was more clearly established by the theatrical framing of the 
performance. This negotiation of touch enables an intriguing playfulness by allowing the 
disruption of social norms, but it is also critical to the fundamental experience of the bodyÕs 
presence in the virtual world. By attempting to touch others and by seeing that touch received, 
a form of ÔtogethernessÕ is both perceived and acknowledged.  I experience being in this 
virtual space with you because you acknowledge my touch as having validity, having a level 
of ÔrealityÕ in your experience, even though neither of us can feel it physically. Our mutual 
agreement to touch enables us to be present together. 
 
Yet, as I mentioned earlier, there was more here than simply the illusion of touch. These 
telematic performances offered the affordance to experiment with the doing of action. Whilst 
the act itself could not be completed (i.e. we could not touch the flesh of the virtual other) the 
doing of that action drew upon embodied memories of the physical acts of moving and 
touching to inform the virtual experience.  This led to some of the physical anticipation of the 
culmination of the act, as if a shadow of the act itself. So those cultural norms cannot be quite 
suspended, because the individual is engaged in the embodied experience of doing the action. 
Kozel explains:  
 
digitally mediated communications can be construed as processes of connecting, 
intents to achieve proximity, and attempts at touching, rather than the accomplished 
states of communication, proximity and touchÓ. (2007: 141-2, my emphasis) 
 
Those processes, intents and attempts contain the intention and the anticipation that are the 
precursors to the accomplished states, but in which the body is still implicated physically.   
       
Talking about the physical world, Anne Cranny-Francis (2013: 20) explains how Òuninvited 
or unexpected touch may be regarded as crude, ill-mannered, presumptuous or even 
criminalÓ.  Touch that is unintentional, for example in a crowded train, is often followed by 
an apology or ignored as if it had not occurred.  Connection and touch are inseparable for 
Cranny-Francis:  
 
One cannot not touch, so one is always connected to the world Ð to other people, 
species, objects, phenomena.Ó (2013: 20, my emphasis)   
 
So for example my hands touch the keyboard as I type these words, while my body is in 
contact with the chair in which I sit and my feet rest upon the carpet. Yet in a virtual 
environment, one cannot touch the virtual objects, people and phenomena, although one can 
touch oneÕs own body and the physical objects around it (which may or may not be visible, 
for example if you are using a head-mounted display unit).  So the touch-connection is a 
constant factor in the physical or material world but it is missing from the virtual world, 
leaving us adrift in a visually prioritized existence that apparently highlights the separation of 
our bodies from that which we see. This explains the significance and urgency of the reach, as 
you and I in our telematic environment enact touching and being touched as part of the 
process of constituting our presence together in that virtual space, connecting our physicality 
to the virtual through the doing of actions.  
 
White Island 
So far I have discussed performances in which performers, or performers and participants, 
have used touch to connect with other people in virtual spaces.  There is a strong sense that 
connection between individuals can be achieved because both individuals enact the touch, i.e. 
touch is both extended and received through mutual agreement. Yet Cranny-Francis explained 
that not only are we physically connected to other people, we are also in constant physical 
contact with the world.  I am going to draw now upon an installation titled White Island by 
Gibson / Martelli
3
, in order to discuss in more detail how proprioception, corporeal 
understandings of space and embodied knowledge come into play in touch within virtual 
reality.   
 
Ruth Gibson is a dancer specializing in Skinner Releasing Technique and Bruno Martelli is a 
digital artist and computer programmer, and they collaborate with other artists on a project-
by-project basis.  White Island is an installation within their 80¡N exhibition of 2014.  It 
incorporates an Oculus Rift virtual reality head-mounted display unit to take the participant 
on a journey in a hot air balloon over the Arctic Circle. It was inspired by the doomed Arctic 
exploration trip led by Solomon August Andre in 1897. Andre and two fellow explorers 
attempted to navigate a specially designed balloon over the ice to the North Pole, but 
misfortune resulted in a crash and the loss of the lives of all three explorers. Their story was 
discovered in 1930 when their bodies were found on Kvit¿ya (White Island), preserved by the 
cold, along with expedition documentation in the form of diaries and photographs.  
 
In White Island, the participant enters a virtual world in which he or she is suspended in a hot 
air balloon basket over the vast Arctic landscape, driven and buffeted by gales and 
snowstorms. The installation comprises a thick, rough rope stretched vertically floor to low 
ceiling, attached at the base to a stage weight and at the top to a metal rig.  Next to the rope, 
an Oculus Rift headset dangles by a wire from the overhead rig. Experiencing this installation 
at the Coleman Project Space, London in June 2014, I put on the headset and found myself in 
a hot air balloon, floating over a snowy landscape. Snowflakes were blowing past as I hung 
suspended in the dark basket, just big enough for one person, with the handrail encircling me 
at waist-height. Looking upwards, I saw a large black hot air balloon with dark wing-like sails 
jutting out of either side. There were black ropes running vertically between the basket and 
the balloon. My hand gripped the physical rope, which helped me to balance as I looked 
around. Below the basket were white hillsides, glaciers and valleys, with occasional dark 
rivers snaking their way along the clefts. The howling wind was suggested in the low sound 
track played into the room and in the horizontal snowflakes flying past my face.  The basket 
travelled with some speed in a relentless motion that could sometimes change quite suddenly 
with the vagaries of the wind. I tugged and hauled on the physical rope to go upwards and 
downwards, lifting the basket so that it scraped over hills and dropping down into vales.  
 
The three-dimensional virtual reality of the Oculus Rift headset immersed me in the 
experience as I turned and saw the world all around me and looked up at the balloon. Slight 
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disorientation occurred when I glanced towards the places where I could feel my hand on the 
rope and my feet on the floor but I saw nothing except the basket, ropes and the driving snow. 
Unlike in the telematic performances that I described earlier, there was no representation of 
my body in this installation, no avatar to show me where I was in this virtual space.  I looked 
ahead to the side of a huge mountain looming towards me and I decided (as one often does in 
virtual worlds) to see what would happen if I let the balloon crash into it. The basket careened 
towards the white slopes, which filled my field of vision. Instinctively I cowered away, 
raising my arms to my head for protection. I felt my arms brush my face but I saw nothing 
come between my eyes and the enormous, snowy rock face. I shut my eyes, and the 
reassuring visible bulk of my physicality was restored by the dark of my eyelids, as I heard a 
crashing boom on the sound track that seemed to reverberate dully through my body. Opening 
my eyes I saw the landscape flashing with pale color and then returning to monochrome as 
the balloon somehow skimmed over the top of the mountain and continued on its previous 
journey through the snow-filled skies. 
 
Proprioception  
The Oculus Rift head-mounted display unit provides the visual impression that the participant 
is located physically within the virtual environment. When the participant turns around, or 
looks up or down, she sees the virtual environment all around her, as the headset presents a 
three-dimensional stereoscopic image on two screens directly in front of her eyes.  This 
results in visual perception similar to the way in which the eyes and brain perceive the 
physical world. This impression is underscored by the way that the movement of participantÕs 
head and body is reflected in the perspective displayed on the screens before her eyes, which 
adjusts her view of the virtual world to match her positioning in a manner that matches 
physical-world expectations. So for example, when I leant forward to look over the edge of 
the basket, I could see the different perspective as if I were present in a three-dimensional 
world. (This is different from working with a two-dimensional monitor screen, where one 
may try to lean forward or sideways to look around a corner but it makes no difference to the 
image displayed.) In White Island there was no avatar to represent my body; I could see but I 
could not be seen Ð not even by my own eyes.  When I looked at where I felt my arms or my 
legs to be, there was nothing. Instead I experienced what seemed to be a phantom body that 
existed only via my internal senses, which made me think of the phantom limb phenomenon 
that is sometimes experienced by amputees. In his fascinating book titled The Man Who 
Mistook His Wife for a Hat (2015[1985]), neurophysiologist Oliver Sacks wrote about 
phantom limb pain, leading him to describe the set of internal senses known as the 
proprioceptive senses. He explained that the term ÔproprioceptionÕ was first coined in the 
1890s by a doctor called Sherrington, referring to: 
 that continuous but unconscious sensory flow from the movable parts of our body 
(muscles, tendons, joints), by which their position and tone and motion is continually 
monitored and adjusted, but in a way which is hidden from us because it is automatic 
and unconscious. (47) 
 
Sherrington called proprioception our Òsixth senseÓ, encompassing internal connectivity, 
spatiality and movement. It brought with it new ways of knowing the world for the twentieth 
century. These ways of knowing are now much more commonly recognized, particularly in 
the field of dance, where understanding of proprioception is an important aspect of somatic 
practices.  
 
I was aware of my own physicality within the virtual reality of White Island, as my 
proprioceptive senses provided feedback on the interconnectivity and movement of my 
muscles, tendons and joints. It was through my proprioceptive senses that I knew my arms 
were raised in front of my face, even though I could not see them. Yet there was no avatar 
onto which I could map the sensations of my bodily interiority.  This seemed to be 
fundamentally at odds with so many screen-based virtual worlds in which the body is at least 
nominally represented.  For example, in multiplayer online games like World of Warcraft or 
Fallout 4, or in dedicated avatar design games like Cosplay, the emphasis is on the visual 
design of the avatarÕs body features and clothes. The visual image is everything! In White 
Island, the visual image of my body simply did not exist, despite the fact that I was located in 
a naturalistic visual representation of the Arctic and the hot air balloon, experiencing gravity 
on both my body and the balloon. Sacks explains that the removal of a sense often results in 
intensification of one or more other senses in compensation. In the absence of a visual 
reference point, my proprioceptive senses defined my physicality. This highlighted my 
awareness of my whole bodily interface with the virtual environment. 
 
Shortly before Sherrington coined the term ÔproprioceptionÕ, philosopher Henri Bergson 
(1911) had become deeply interested in the bodyÕs actions and their relationships with matter 
and memory (the title of his seminal book). Bergson acknowledged the materiality of the 
body, and its connection as a material thing to the material world in which it existed.  He 
prioritized the bodyÕs actions as the route via which it received from and gave back to the 
material world. He wrote: ÒMy body, an object destined to move other objects, is, then, a 
centre of actionÓ. (1911: 5) This relates back to Cranny-FrancisÕ comment, Òone cannot not 
touchÓ, since being a material body in a material world means that one is inextricably 
entwined with the other. BergsonÕs p
where the digitally generated world has none of the materiality of the body. This 
inconsistency in the materialities of body and world impacted strongly upon my experiences 
in White Island.  I chose to keep hold of the physical rope for the majority of the time that I 
wore the Oculus Rift headset, and there were two main reasons for my reticence to release it. 
Firstly, it was the only method of controlling the height of the hot air balloon in which I 
drifted amongst steep mountains and valleys. Whilst crashing was an irresistible temptation 
from time to time, it was also interesting to explore the virtual world and so I chose to 
maintain control as far as possible for much of the time. However, my choice not to let go 
was also related to a desire to maintain grounding in the physical world. The roughness of the 
rope against my palm and its resistance to free movement (fixed at top and bottom) gave me a 
physical reference point that was both physically stabilizing and psychologically comforting. 
In BergsonÕs terms, it permitted an exchange between the materiality of my body and the 
world, and for Cranny-Francis, it was a point of connection to the world. The fact that I 
vaguely associated the rough physical rope with the virtual ropes that I could see around me 
added to the sense of connection with both the physical and virtual worlds. This became 
important to me as the mismatch between my proprioceptive and visual perceptions of my 
body sometimes caused me to feel unstable. At one point I reached out to grip the hot air 
balloonÕs basket railing, but my invisible hand groped about in the air, searching for the 
virtual railing that I could see in front of me. I felt a momentary loss of balance caused by my 
subconscious anticipation of grasping the rail. Much contemporary philosophy defines the 
ÔrealÕ by lived experience rather than by definitions of physical and virtual (Hansen 2006: 5). 
But which was more real to me Ð my proprioceptively present, visually absent hand or the 
visually present, proprioceptively absent railing? Without feeling the roughness of the rope in 
my other hand, I found that I was not necessarily certain. Such confusion did not occur in my 
experiences of any of the performances that I discussed earlier. The two beds provided 
consistent visual and physical reference points for Kozel and the participants in Telematic 
Dreaming, on which they could see their body images together.  Both bodies and objects were 
virtually represented in Unheimlich, and the theatrical context encouraged playful 
engagement with Ôwhat ifÕ and Ôimagine thatÕ activities.  Escape Velocity was a rehearsed 
improvisation by two performers in which both illusion and experience played their parts. But 
in White Island, I was immersed in a three-dimensional world that looked and felt ÔrealÕ in my 
experience, and yet in which I apparently did not exist as anything other than a ghostly, 
invisible presence. 
 
Can the body be fooled? 
Deidre Sklar writes about the relationship between seeing and not seeing in relation to 
knowledge. Coming from the dual perspectives of dance and philosophy, she contrasts visual 
and proprioceptive perceptions and the ways in which they are considered to relate to 
objectivity and subjectivity:  
 
Seeing implies an object, something to see. And in order to see an object, one must be 
separate from it, at enough distance to bring it into focus. É The objectification 
implicit in seeing is associated with the objectivity of the mind, while the somatic 
sensation implicit in touch is associated with nearness and the subjectivity of 
proprioception. (2008: 87) 
 
If we cannot see our bodies from the outside then the only immediate perception of physical 
being is via our proprioceptive senses (including touch), and thus those senses tend to be 
foregrounded where normally they might recede from conscious attention. For example, when 
trying to find my way in a dark room, I might experience a stronger sense of my moving body 
and its contact with the objects around it.  The lack of a visible body in White Island leads to 
the denial of objective knowledge of the body, prioritizing subjective engagement and 
somatic sensation.  Sklar draws attention to the problem of the limitations of language, with 
its separatist consequences forcing me to describe my body as if it were something that 
ÒbelongsÓ to me. Yet, as her explanation demonstrates, it is partly the ability to see the body 
that leads to this objectification, since the body can be observed as if from outside via the 
eyes. Interestingly, many computer gamers choose to play games in Ôfirst-personÕ perspective, 
rather than Ôthird-personÕ, i.e. the screen becomes the viewpoint from avatarÕs ÔeyesÕ, rather 
than the avatarÕs body being visible on the screen.  Martelli explains that first-person 
perspective gives him a stronger sense of being ÔthereÕ in the virtual world (cited in Popat 
2012: 16); perhaps engaging body-based knowledge more readily to play the game more 
effectively. However, even first-person games generally show the avatarÕs arm in the lower 
right portion of the screen (rarely are avatars left-handed) in order to provide a visible body 
presence.  The absence of visual engagement with my body when it would normally be 
visible draws attention to its subjective presence in relation to the virtual space. 
 
Yet how is the experience of space constructed? Anthropologist Maxine Sheets-Johnstone 
(1990) draws upon her interest in movement and dance to consider Merleau-PontyÕs 
examination of George StrattonÕs experiments with inverted vision. In these experiments, 
StrattonÕs research team wore glasses that inverted the image so that the world appeared to be 
upside down.  Over time, the researchers noticed that their brains compensated for the 
inversion, and they began to see the world the right way up whilst still wearing the same 
glasses.  Merleau-Ponty (1962: 246) proposed that space is essentially visually constructed, 
and that better understandings of spatial concepts might be achieved through the disruption or 
distortion of normal modes of perception as demonstrated in this experiment.
 
 Critiquing 
Merleau-PontyÕs argument, Sheets-Johnstone proposes a corporeal perspective.  She points 
out that it is possible to invert vision and thus temporarily confuse spatial orientation, but it is 
not possible to undertake such an inversion of the proprioceptive senses:  
 
[T]he tactile-kinaesthetic body cannot be fooled. É Space at its source is a corporeal 
space defined by the intrinsic spatiality of animate form and the inherent spatial 
possibilities of the tactile-kinaesthetic body. (1990: 286-7) 
 
In White Island, the space is visually constructed in a similar manner to StrattonÕs glasses, as 
the participant sees the three-dimensional virtual world via the two screens before her eyes 
within the Oculus Rift headset. My tactile-kinaesthetic body inhabited that visual space to 
some extent as a corporeal space, feeling slight vertigo when the balloon was at its highest, 
and reacting to the impact of the crash.  Yet my attempt to touch the basket railing resulted in 
confusion between corporeal and visual experience.  If my body cannot be fooled, why did 
that momentary confusion occur? 
 
In White Island, embodied experience is subtle and blurred. Conceptually we understand that 
the environment is realistic but we know also that we are not actually there. Yet the bodyÕs 
experiences that environment as if it were real, or perhaps more accurately as if it were Ônot 
not realÕ. Indeed cognitive neuroscience research has shown that we readily fall into a mode 
of Ôresponse-as-if-realÕ in virtual reality environments, even at low-resolution (de la Pea 
2010: 293). According to Sheets-Johnstone, the body cannot be fooled, so perhaps it is 
drawing upon knowledge to which cognitive perception does not have access. Henri Bergson 
argued that every being is surrounded by Òthe zone of indeterminationÓ (1911: 23); its 
amplitude dependent upon the relations of that being to other things. This zone consists of all 
of our memories, experiences and past relationships with objects and people. It contains our 
histories and our habits; Òimpregnated with our pastÓ (24). Bergson argues that this 
indetermination Òconstitutes the principal share of individual consciousnessÓ in the ways that 
we perceive the world (25).  So I carry with me all of my experiences of being a material 
body in this material world, and of taking action in the world. These embodied, kinetic 
memories exist at a deep level, separate from our conscious thought, accrued via a lifetime of 
physical action. Bergson refers to this as Òbodily memoryÓ, which he describes as Òthe sum of 
the sensori-motor systems organized by habitÓ (197). So, for example, you never forget how 
to ride a bike because it is in your bodily memory.  In White Island, these embodied or 
ÒbodilyÓ memories were collided with the conceptual understanding that I could not have 
physical contact with the virtual world. My body became blurred, existing between the 
definable points of physical and virtual, so that the experience of the environment was Ônot 
not realÕ. I braced myself for impact against the mountainside, my pulse raised slightly in 
anticipation. I knew that I would not crash but I experienced the act of crashing as not being 
not real. Clearly my body was not fooled Ð anticipation of a real crash would have resulted in 
much stronger physical responses Ð but my perceptions of the virtual experience were deeply 
informed by my embodied knowledge of the physical world. The space was neither corporeal 
nor virtual, since it was defined by my bodyÕs deep proprioceptive knowledge colouring the 
virtual world with shades of physical experience. I did not know whether my body or the 
railing was more ÔrealÕ as I reached out to grip it, because my objective knowledge of the 
world was disrupted by my missing body, and my proprioceptive senses refused those 
binaries of physical/virtual, real/unreal.  
 
Some final thoughts 
Telematic Dreaming, Escape Velocity and Unheimlich all draw upon the deep proprioceptive 
knowledge and embodied memories of the body.  It is this that leads participants to desire 
touch as a way of constituting their presence together in virtual space, since it connects one 
body with another, and the virtual with the physical action.  I feel myself reaching out 
proprioceptively, and you feel your physical response to receive or return that virtual touch.  
This access to embodied knowledge is so strong that it can lead to instinctive responses 
despite knowing that we are not actually in the virtual world.  For example, Kozel folded up 
when her virtual body was suddenly elbowed in the stomach, and I could not help but cower 
with beating heart in anticipation of crashing into the virtual mountainside.  Embodied 
memories accessed proprioceptively enable us to do the un-doable, rehearse the un-
rehearsable in virtual worlds, gaining something of the embodied experience through the 
doing of actions that can never be completed.   
 
Other disciplines, including philosophy and cognitive neuroscience, have engaged in various 
ways with knowledge located within the body. However, dance is still better equipped than 
most to draw directly upon experiences of embodied knowledge, since such knowledge is 
accessed regularly within the study of dance.  In my interdisciplinary research with scientists, 
engineers and computer programmers, we always start by taking a dance class together so that 
we begin to develop a shared basis for talking about movement as experience and knowledge.  
The field of virtual reality was burgeoning in the 1990s, but it lost much of its momentum in 
the early part of the new millennium. The fresh emergence of contemporary, commercially 
viable, lightweight headsets is likely to lead to a revival of interest and growth in virtual 
reality products for the home entertainments and other markets.  Dance has much to offer to 
the understanding and development of virtual reality as lived experience, and there is also 
much that dance as a discipline might learn about movement by engaging deeply in embodied 
experiences within virtual worlds.   
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